

Challenging the Coast: An Anthropological Contribution to Integrated Coastal Development.

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Challenging coasts and challenging the coast

Worldwide natural scientific and political concerns about climatic change, carbon dioxide emission, sea level rise, and an international environmentalist concern about biodiversity conservation have been running parallel to each other for over two decades. At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro of 1992 a poverty alleviation discourse was linked to sustainable development. The concern about this allegedly causal relationship permeated policies and projects throughout the last decade, making it a part of a collective interventionist development discourse calling for ICZM or Integrated Coastal Zone Development (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1998; Kay and Alder, 1999; Woodhouse, 2000: 141-162).

Recently, the political scientist Homer-Dixon developed a theory claiming a causal link between poverty and an unsustainable use of natural resources, and international conflict. This model is widely embraced by neoliberal policy makers, who see the model as a source of legitimation for interventionist approaches toward - primarily land-based - 'marginal areas' (Homer-Dixon, 1999; for a critique see: Hartmann, 2001; Fairhead, 2001). It does not need a *tsunami* to include coastal areas and artisanal fishers in this discourse, especially in the rapidly urbanising coastal areas of the Southern hemisphere.

Why have coasts become so challenging? And why should anthropologists challenge the often interventionist approaches to coastal 'management' that are labeled ICZM?

From coastal zone management to coastal development research

Due to complexities of scale, there are no single governance bodies that enable the management of the natural and human resources of coastal zones simultaneously at



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international, national, subnational, and local levels. Legal instruments and (co-)management forms of organisation are developed to this purpose, but their implementation is fraught with practical difficulties and political contestation. Their common goal of control and organisation parallels the political interests that in the 1950-1960s stressed the need for institutional development and control (Heady 1991). In this vein, integrated coastal zone management or ICZM has become known as a policy instrument for intervention by states or transnational bodies in order to control coastal zone risks, like sea level rise, the loss of marine biodiversity, and demographic pressure. But ICZM as a tool of governance necessarily simplifies and standardises factual diversity and diversification, because it serves the need of a specific form of knowledge and control by the state. Scott (1998) has called this the state's 'tunnel vision'.

Coastal zone management as an instrument for government intervention is closely linked to the particular objective of risk aversion. It can be seen as a means avert the risk of inundation of the land from the sea, or of safeguarding marine biodiversity from negative human intervention. During the last decade, poverty alleviation has been added to the agenda of sustainable resource use and biodiversity, also in the field of marine biodiversity. Consequently, the meaning and purpose of coastal zone management are broadened to become a tool for the sustainable development of human and natural resources in coastal areas. What is actually happening is a conflation and confusion of the two different objectives of management and development. Coastal zone management is focussed on the aversion of the risk of inundation and siltation, while integrated coastal development is directed at poverty alleviation through alternative social-economic and political-administrative development regarding particular social actors who are living in the coastal zone.

In this paper I question the top-down, positivistic and instrumentalist approach to coastal zone management, including buzz-words like 'stakeholder' and 'co-management', as the product of an organisational dream by national and transnational policy makers. Such organisational models become increasingly distanced from policy implementation and everyday social practices. I will search for an alternative approach to integrated coastal development, starting with a discussion on governance where I make use of Foucaultian notions of governmentality, power and disciplin. In the end I am interested from a cognitive anthropological perspective, into *what and why* people are doing something, rather than from a normative idea of what people *should be doing*. The coastal development planning of the Berau District of Northeast Kalimantan will serve as a case study.



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On governmentality

Since its introduction by the World Bank in the late 1980s, the term governance has become a 'garbage can' concept with as many definitions as there are researchers (Nuijten, 2004). Studies focussing on political or institutional control are broadening to include the practical conditions of governance (Benda-Beckmann, 1994; Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998; Johnson, 2004; Ostrom, 1990; Sargeson, 2002). Following the attention for participatory development and issues of (good) governance, co-management and legal-pluralism were also linked to studies on fisheries. Co-management and stakeholders involvement have now become general topics for conference papers and publications on fisheries management (Bavinck, 2001; Jentoft, 1989, 2004; Ostrom et al., 2002; Seixas and Berkes, 2004).

Recently, Kooiman has applied an interactionist approach to explain different modes and dynamics of governance (Kooiman, 2003). He distinguishes between governance (a set of interactions to solve societal problems) from *governability* (the status of a system expressing the relation between its needs to be governed and its capacities to govern) (Paper MARE Conference, Amsterdam 7-9 July 2005). Although such an approach is a step forward of public administration scholars who acknowledge the interaction of those who are in the government with societal and non-governmental actors, it runs the risk of reifying a *system* of interactions, including law and normative rules. As such, it remains close to legal-pluralism and structural- institutional approaches.

When I went to NE Kalimantan in 2004 in preparation for research on integrated coastal development, I was struck by the many different interpretations of what was happening, and the different dreams and fears of coastal people. One thing was certain and clear to all: the future of the Berau delta was going to be very different, but how this new situation was going to be governed was very uncertain. The dynamics and differences in perception encountered can not be sufficiently explained by system-oriented theory because of the contestations of value and meaning that would then be 'internal' to the system, hence remain undiscovered. Instead, I think there is a demand for a more practice-oriented approach, which follows the local responses to formal decentralisation agendas, pays attention to the justification and legitimation of resource claims, including their institutional environment. I would look for a particular power-knowledge nexus and the understanding of 'governing' as cognitive-social



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interaction. Institutions are organisations *plus* ideas which have a certain effect on people's thoughts and actions. But also individual and group actors play a role in the affirmation of or the resistance to these effects. This implies a more open or 'fluid' practice of governing, which is not merely an act of the State through public administration institutions (the government), but also includes all kind of interrelationships between governing bodies and society. International development is increasingly governed by power and knowledge constellations between national governments, transnational NGOs and industries, and social movements at different levels of society which makes it problematic to speak in terms of a vertical hierarchy of levels in global governance (Duffield, 2002; Ferguson, 1998).

Both authors critically apply and adapt Foucault's notion of *governmentality* to the domain of international development. Originally, it refers to the ongoing efforts of authorities to develop appropriate ways of governing people by promoting their health and capacities, while avoiding the direct exercise of power on their lives. Although the underlying neoliberal assumptions of democracy and citizenship are certainly problematic in most parts of the world, it is interesting to look into the intellectual development of a scholar like the French philosopher-historian Foucault, because he is still a structuralist in many ways but has also embraced the post-structuralist thinking about power. In his view, power is not only negative in the sense of a constraining and repressing force; power can also be productive, enabling creativity and inventiveness to develop new forms of behaviour, for example as a resistance to power. We find a similar line of thought in James Scott's *Weapons of the weak* (1985). Thus, power is not the Weberian power as a capacity that is ascribed only to powerful people, or the institution of the State, to realise their will over the will of others, and to do things even against their will. Power is not a limited good 'owned' by some at the expense of others who are consequently seen as powerless. In Foucaultian thinking, power is less 'possessed' by individuals or groups; it is rather a strategy or something a social actor does or performs in a particular context. Power is a set of relationships which are dispersed throughout society rather than being located within particular institutions such as the State or the government. Neither does power impose its rationality upon the totality of society, as there are multiple power relationships (Mills, 2003: 34), for example in family relations, in the relationships within a hospital or prison and the rest of society, and both within and between governments, societal, or transnational religious organisations.



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Foucault designed the concept of *discipline* to deal with the specific 'regimes of truth' that social actors (individuals and institutions) develop through their interactions. Not normative notions are the central concern, but discipline as a set of strategies, procedures, and ways of behaving which are associated with certain institutional contexts, and which then permeate ways of thinking and behaving in general (Mills, 2003: 44). I find this a fascinating way of looking at societal change and institutional developments, like decentralisation, because on the one hand it builds onto a cognitive-structuralist way of thinking about social interaction and, on the other hand, it allows more space for studying actor-oriented cognitive and practical dynamics. Discipline is being internalised by the social actors, that is one is forced to act *as if* one is constantly being surveyed even if one is not. For example, Foucault's panopticon in prisons, the closed-circuit of TV-cameras in shopping centres and police cameras on the highways, but we could also think of tax registration, ID-cards and iris-scans for passports.

This notion of power and discipline also implies a re-consideration of the concept of authority, and the strategic ways actors apply to escape from 'fixed' relationships of authority and rules. When we look, for instance, at the behaviour of fishermen and the attitude of government departments toward what they call *illegal* fisheries, the Foucaultian concepts of power and discipline provide much more space for the description and contestation of the different strategies of actors like fishermen and public administrators or policy makers. A legal-pluralistic approach, highlighting the fact that laws and regulations at different organisational levels overlap is insufficient to describe the strategic actions taken by fishers to fight for their locally recognised *hak petuanan* or tenurial rights to the sea. Or, the fact that cyanide fishing is formally illegal, does not explain the practice of continued 'illegal' action and their justification by fishers (Adhuri, 2002; Walley, 2004). Another highly contested conception is the notion of territory held by the different actors in the social field of the Berau delta (*see below*).

Berau as a case study

The Eastern Kalimantan district of Berau (21,087 km²; 120,000 inh.) includes land-based as well as sea-based resource uses and tenurial systems that mutually influence each other at different spatial and temporal scales. Ecologically, the structural complexity of the Berau coast, with its mangrove forest adjacent to a shallow sea fringed by coral atolls and reefs with a high aquatic biodiversity, to a large extent determines the diverse use options of coastal and



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marine resources. Pressures on the coastal ecology appear to be the outcome of resource dynamics at different scales of fishing effort allocation, *tambak* shrimp culture, coastal urbanisation, marine park area *cum* eco-tourism development planning, upstream agro-industrial development of oilpalm plantations, and logging activities. The political-economic priorities of local government officials, who in many cases are also a member of the economic elite in the coastal area, tend to favour short-term economic exploitation at the expense of sustainable resource tenure, threatening the livelihoods of the small-scale fishers and shifting cultivators who are close to the poverty line. In the Berau delta similar developments are taking place as in the Mahakam delta (Bourgeois et al., 2002), where for example the rapid conversion of tidal mangrove forests into stagnant pond systems for shrimp culture has affected the whole coastal ecosystem. The important difference with the Mahakam area is the high biodiversity value of the Berau delta (nature.org; www.kehati.or.id). Fish production in Berau is 13,156 tons of which 91 % from marine fisheries, 0,5 % shrimp aquaculture, and 0,2 % or 28,8 tons of turtle eggs (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan, 2003).

Meanwhile, the economic *frontier* is rapidly moving north from Mahakam to the Berau delta, attracting migrants from both landward and seaward sides. The agro-industrial and fish culture potential makes the Berau delta into a social, economic and political frontier area, attracting outside entrepreneurs who often are more powerful than local people. In Northeast Kalimantan, trans-island migration from Sulawesi has a long history of trading and smuggling (logs, weapons, fish) between Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Malaysia, which goes back to at least the 1950s, resulting in an ongoing flux of labour, material wealth, and technical knowledge into the Berau area. The older generations of Bugis immigrants have settled, often married local women, and become attached to the land, which they express by being proud of a Berau identity, calling themselves *orang Berau*. In their turn they employ newly immigrating members of their extensive kin-based network from Sulawesi who provide the manpower for the tiresome work of Nipa palm excavation and the construction of shrimp aquaculture. These *sawi* or dependent families have no direct access to the land and its produce, and largely remain isolated from the local villages.

Related to the externally triggered development of the Berau delta, inland Dayak shifting cultivators were also attracted to move toward the coast. Over the years, they too adopted a new identity, likewise indicating a shift from Christianity to Islam; they call themselves *orang Melayu*. In the coastal foothills they are socially, ethnically, historically, and economically



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distinct from the Javanese and Balinese transmigrants who were settled in the Berau coastal area who have created themselves an economic niche as vegetable producers/vendors in the coastal villages. The Christian Dayak villages along the rivers are also attracting Christian and Moslem in-migrants, for example from Flores, Timor, and Mandar who start a new livelihood in combinations of agricultural, logging, and trading activities.

On the islands in front of the Berau delta, which together are called Derawan Islands, the inhabitants have yet another origin. Here live the Bajau (Solok) people who claim their origin from The Philippines. Bajau people are generally called 'sea nomads' (Lowe, 2003; Chou, 1997) although they are all but wandering about without possessing any resource tenure practices. In Berau, these islanders primarily make a living on fisheries and fish trade, including salted fish, sea cucumber, seagrass and, incidentally, turtle eggs. The Bajau care about the sea; marine tenure is expressed in terms of 'looking after an adoptive child (Chou, 1997). The Bajau people of Berau recognise territorial use rights on coral gardens in the coastal waters, and in places where they put up temporary fishing devices. Their tenurial claims on coral gardens are contested by the Bugis and Berau people living in the Berau delta, as well as by intruding foreign trawlers. Incidentally, these contestations develop into open conflict (cf. Adhuri, 2004). Thus, the coastal area of Berau is has a notoriously versatile and heterogeneous history, ecologically as well as socially and administratively. Those who occupy important political-economic power positions in Berau are primarily Berau, and also Bajau/Bugis men *and women* who act as the regional 'bosses' or patrons-brokers (*punggawa*) (Acciaioli, 1998, 2002; Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Hidayat and Firdausy, 2003; McCargo, 2002; McVey, 2000; Pelras 2000, Turner and Podger, 2003). They have become actively involved in regional policy agenda setting and they are the ones who are likely to occupy the institutional void (*see below*) created by administrative and political decentralisation.

For an anthropology of integrated coastal development we propose to take the Berau District Planning Bureau's *Coastal Zone Development Plan 2001-2011* as a point of departure for the analysis of the interaction between natural and social dynamics at various scales. This choice is made, not out of a wish to comply with the 'participatory development planning' agenda which has been criticised (Mosse, 2004) and whose popularity is already giving way to more neoliberal managerial agendas. As an alternative to an instrumental ICZM approach we have opted to start from the *practice* of governance in a particular context which allows us to



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investigate the different ways of disciplining by the governing individuals and groups (*see above*).

The Planning Bureau (Bappeda Berau, 2000: IX-9) gives priority to two economic developments, namely shrimp aquaculture in the delta and the establishment of a marine park area in the coastal waters in a context of increasing population mobility. However, the District Plan does not regard these two development trajectories as conflicting from a developmental perspective. Yet, they are mutually exclusive from an environmental and also from a social-cultural perspective, involving conflicting conceptions of resource tenure and territoriality. Although the two are not seen as mutually exclusive in the planning, they are indeed mutually exclusive in practice and territorially, since shrimp aquaculture on former Nipa-mangrove forest land, and marine park development on the basis of a healthy coastal environment which includes Nipa-mangrove forests, require different resource management policies and political decisions. But, from the decentralised administrative perspective which forces districts governments to earn their own income, both aquaculture and marine park ecotourism development are equifinal development trajectories aiming at the increase of the regional (APBD) income. Thus, our scientific analysis should not only provide knowledge on resource use and tenurial practices, but also on the justifications and sources of legitimation of the overlapping and competing claims on the Berau coast. The justifications and legitimations of the different resource claims are based on competing conceptions that have practical/technical, social, cultural, economic and political origins in the historical and territorial identifications of the different social actors with the common space of the Berau delta. Therefore, we need to understand the different ontologies of governance practices of the various actors - apart from the relevance of the practical value of administrative rules and sectoral laws and regulations, like zonation.

In the Berau case, the starting point is the fact that the coastal waters and their resources are valued differently by the various coastal actors. Those who are the more numerous do not necessarily have more power, like artisanal fishermen. So, the various coastal actors with their views, definitions of the situations, and practices, are merely juxtaposed, before we can even think of calling them 'stakeholders'.

First, there are the Bajau, Bugis, and Berau fishers who make their living at sea. They regard the coastal waters as subject to common pool access rules, but closer to the villages and in



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particular places, like beneath a *rompong*, the sea is subject to particular tenurial regimes of *hak ulayat laut*, whereas the resource units (fish, *teripang*, turtle eggs) are regarded as private property. Both local and international trawlers and live reef fish traders are competing for access to the common pool of marine and coastal waters and its wealth of fish and sea cucumbers.

In contrast, natural scientists from international and national NGOs (WWF, TNC, Kehati) see the coastal waters of the Berau delta, including the Derawan Islands, primarily as a biodiversity hotspot because of their wealth of coral reefs and turtles. Their goal is the conservation of particular maritime species, and they do not necessarily consider their value for local people.

Finally, the government or the state is involved. But we should be careful not to treat the various levels as one actor. Even the district government can not be regarded as a single actor, because the officials and policy makers of the sectoral departments of Forestry (on mangrove) and Fisheries may have different perspectives on the need and direction of coastal development between themselves, or they may differ from the Bupati or the Planning Bureau. One government actor is the Berau district Planning Bureau, who translate the translocal biodiversity conservation goals into their own political-economic goal of Marine Park Area development for ecotourism in the Berau delta. Simultaneously, local civil and military elites are expecting rapid economic growth, both to support an increase of the district income under decentralised government and in favour of their private incomes from shrimp aquaculture in the delta, so they are heavily involved in the rapid expansion of shrimp aquaculture in an area that is at the same time mapped as future marine park.

Thus, the Berau delta and Derawan islands are becoming a highly contested space for marine resources by global and local actors, including scientists, with different interests and power.

The discipline of decentralised governance

The most dramatic change in the struggle over coastal goods has undoubtedly been the recent political-administrative decentralisation and the shift in orientation from the nation to a complex constellation of constituent parts. Therefore, research to understand decentralisation should pay more attention to factors that influence the behaviour of the local state elite (Hidayat and Firdausy, 2003; Warren and McCarthy, 2002).



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The different environmental and developmental knowledges of government bureaus, the network of international and local NGOs, in-migrating aquaculture businessmen, and indigenous fishers co-exist and only partly interact. Institutions governing the access and use of the common pool resources of the Berau delta are weak, especially under conditions of an 'institutional void' created by the recent decentralisation. This means that there are no generally accepted rules and norms according to which policy making and politics is to be conducted (Hajer, 2003:175). Moreover, the 'non-emergence' of institutions governing the commons effectuates an open access regime (Dietz, 2002; McCay, 2002), which is characterised by a disjuncture between rules and practices of coastal and marine tenure (McCarthy, 2000) to the advantage of a regional political-economic elite of bureaucrats, military, and economic strongmen (McCargo, 2002; Obidzinski, 2003).

Current debates focus on the decentralisation process from the centre, whereas this research project departs from the significance of local agency and the ways in which district/provincial elites deal with increased power and autonomy (Balland and Platteau, 1996; Booth 1999, McCarthy 2002, McVey 2000; Visser 2001; Warren and McCarthy, 2002). Are the local 'bosses' becoming vehicles of democratic development or of the decentralisation of corruption, and what is the role of indigenous fishers and in-migrant shrimp farmers? Do district level governments in a more decentralised system prove a better arbiter of local rights than the national centre? (Mohan & Stokke 2000). Local agency is increasingly expressed through a discourse of modernised adat (Acciaioli, 2002). What is the contribution of these - often invented - traditional claims to the re-territorialisation of resource claims (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), especially in frontier areas like the coast?

Since the implementation of Indonesia's decentralisation laws about five years ago, the human capacities and capabilities at provincial and especially at district levels are still being challenged. The global push for decentralisation, together with the relative neglect of centralisation runs the risk of creating an institutional void (Hajer, 2003; Patlis, 2004). This implies that institutional and political gaps are created because decentralised bureaus have become responsible for resource income generation, spatial planning, and natural and human resource management under conditions of legal-administrative uncertainty of the division of rights and obligations between central and local administrative units. Moreover, these changes are taking place in Indonesia in an era of rapid societal transformation. The local government



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bureaus in districts like Berau still lack the necessary qualified human resources, whereas the new responsibilities also create new anxieties and insecurities (Satria and Matsuda, 2003). Local government officials are aware of these processes, and expressed to us the need for 'a steering wheel' for the development of scenario's to manage the competing claims on their coastal waters in connection to the wider Berau watershed (*verbal communication* Bappeda Berau secretary, Tanjung Redeb Sept. 2004).

Bappeda expects that eco-tourism will be attracted by the establishment of a marine park area, which will boost the local economy when 36 % of the coastal area would become occupied by eco-tourism related enterprises (Bappeda Berau, 2000). The population of Derawan subdistrict, including the islands and the Berau delta, is counted at 7,413 inhabitants (BPS KalTim, 2000). But if we compare the case of the Wakatobi Marine National Park of Southeast Sulawesi, it is clear that dive eco-tourism during 10 months of the year would earn an income equivalent to a monthly wage of only about 275 people (Clifton, 2004). So, whatever the potential for eco-tourism in Berau, it is clear that the majority of artisanal fishers with only little social, material, and financial capital will not profit from the establishment of a marine park. They rather run the risk of being excluded from marine livelihood opportunities, their territorial fisheries claims being denied (see also Walley, 2004 for a Tanzanian case).

The Coastal Zone Development Plan 2001-2011 sees the delta as State property, and expects it to become a mangrove conservation area. But in practice most 'common property' of the delta is already privately 'owned' by the local elite involved in the shrimp-farming business (pers. observation, 2003), although no formal land registration exists yet for the delta. On the other hand, local communities like the Bajau have explicit tenurial conceptions and *adat* rules about who has the right to access and use 'their' coral gardens, and under what conditions. These different overlapping, and often contested, rules and regulations have never been systematically described and analysed. Consequently, the actual practice of governing the coast is based on myth making and dream production by the various actors involved.

The research I am proposing looks at the ways coastal people, whether they are artisanal fishers, elite trawler owners or policy makers, are subject to but at the same time also generate and use specific constellations of power and knowledge. I am not primarily interested whether cyanide fishing is 'illegal', or whether shrimp culture and marine parks are contradictory. But



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rather, I would like to understand how they internalise information and practices, construct their knowledge and reflect on the knowledge and power of others which makes social actors perceive and call certain practices legal, illegal, contradictory, etc. Not normative notions are the central concern but *discipline*, as a set of strategies, procedures and ways of behaving which are associated with certain institutional contexts and which then permeate ways of thinking and behaving in general (Mills, 2003: 44).

This approach differs from a legal-pluralistic approach to competing claims in that it combines a cognitive anthropology with notions of power, and focusses on practice. In order to understand the social facts of competing claims to coastal and maritime resources, we need to study the ways in which individual and institutional actors access, perceive, change information, create and exchange or negotiate knowledge in particular constellations of power. In doing so, we come close to what has been called as an ‘anthropology of development’ and ‘development anthropology’ (Grillo and Stirrat, 1997). We aim at the twin goals to obtain in-depth knowledge of the complex social, cultural, and political-economic conditions of coastal resource tenure and use, and to inform the formulation of policy scenario’s to strengthen the governance of the Berau coastal area, taking into account the social, cultural, economic and political conceptions and justifications of the competing claims on sea- and land-based resources for the purpose of fisheries and aquaculture development, biodiversity conservation, marine park and ecotourism development, and agro-industrial enterprise.

Territory as example of contested conceptions

Territory may be useful as a proxi for the geophysical contextualisation of demographic and socio-economic or even political data, but there is the danger of (false) reification and simplification in order to improve the legibility of complex interactions in the eyes of the State by foregoing the diversity of *metis* or localized practices (Scott, 1998). Territory imagines a certain visibility, the potential of control, and the explicitness of place in the eyes of actors as different from each other as planners, geographers, politicians, social movements and indigenous people. Territory is a shorthand for everything and each social relationship to space that is represented by geophysical place or by an imagined place on a map. Territorial lines on a map sometimes create – and are themselves created by - historical and global-political rights to states, like the borders drawn on the map of Africa by the colonial powers.



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But in the actual practice of the livelihoods of millions of people these borders are experienced as boundaries which can either be crossed or not, whether physically or social-politically. Forced de-territorialization as a result of territorial claim making by others, without necessarily forcing people to move away from the coastal space. They are not de-located, but their cultural, historical, socio-economic relationships with coastal or maritime ways of living and identification are severed. Similar de-territorialization threatened shifting cultivators in upland areas of Southeast Asia. Here, environmentalists and indigenous people have closed ranks in an attempt to reclaim resources through 'counter-mapping'. That is, the use of maps to show the overlapping, ambiguity, and multiplicity of rights to territory and to argue against state claims by spatially depicting the explicitness and historical priority of local resource control (Peluso, 1995; Tsing, 1999). In both cases, territorial picturing serves the purpose of claim making to place.

I think it is necessary to look beyond the functionality of space, and to broaden the notion of territory in favour of such a cognitive anthropological concept of *territoriality* that allows for the inclusion of value differences and the political dimensions of access and appropriation of natural and environmental resources. We are increasingly confronted with a globalizing world in which the different actors meeting in one particular place have the option to choose from multiple realities concerning space. A concept like territoriality is necessary to counter the generalizing and homogenizing tendencies of globalization that create the false image of developments taking place *in abstracto*. Whereas we need territorialities to explain the social transformations which necessarily take place in particular localities and space, and are embodied with specific ideas and values. The idea of place invariably evokes terrestrial metaphors like 'rooting' or 'grounding', and water is overlooked as 'place' by those on the shore (Lowe, 2003:111). Whether social and political processes of place making are conceived of as ideas and historical constructs or as 'embodied practices' (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997:6), in either case the recent re-definition and translocal application of 'traditonal' or *adat* claims in Indonesia (Acciaioli, 2002; Visser, 1999) show that such territorial claims shape identities and enable resistances. These developments show the non-systematic, fluid quality of social and cultural notions of territory.

Mobility is the very antithesis of 'rootedness' and, likewise, the cognitive-philosophical antithesis to the Western notion of civilisation and the state's policy of stability, simplicity, and legibility, as exemplified by the history of the domestication of human and natural



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resources (Harris, 1996). David Harris asserts (1996: 448) that domesticatory relationships are primarily between people, plants, and animals. Hunting and fishing are forms of predation, associated with the wild, thus excluded from the domain of domestication. Even the creation of fishponds for fish production is given as an example of an ‘interventionist’ method of manipulating aquatic systems, but not as an act of domestication (ibid: 451).

Exclusion on the basis of a mobile livelihood strategy primarily applies to the people and produce (cattle, seeds, and fish) in the cases of nomadism, shifting cultivation, and marine fisheries alike. Thus, the shifting cultivation practices in the geographical ‘uplands’ of Southeast Asia are invariably perceived by outsiders as the social-economic backwaters of civil or urban, even rural society. They are regarded as distant places, fragile ecosystems, poverty stricken villages inhabited by ‘different’ kinds of people and, in the eyes of the military and state politics, as trouble zones (Li, 1999:34).

Assertions about non-sedentary people being the antithesis of ‘civil’ society can be found concerning the alleged marginality of coastal zones and coastal people in general (Lowe, 2003; Bavinck, 2001; Adhuri 2002) and of fisherwomen in particular. A common image of fisherwomen, in The Netherlands as much as in India (Gupta, 2003) is that of being aggressive, uncouth, and using abusive language. Meanwhile, what appears the stigma of disorder can be turned into the pleasure of autonomy (Tsing, 1993:62). Their very exclusion of mainstream ‘civil’ society may also provide coastal people with the cognitive and territorial space to develop cultural and economic counter-images of male strength and female mobility (Ram, 1991). But the fact remains that, despite the early effort of Sir Raymond Firth (1946) who saw the Malay fishermen of as part of the regional peasant economy, the social sciences still show a remarkable land bias, which only recently is being addressed in a growing number of studies on social, legal, and environmental issues concerning coastal societies, sea tenure, the commons, and co-management.

Contrasting to this outsiders’ view, the living actors may position themselves vis à vis the wider social context, including their ancestors, as expressed in the practice of ‘looking after, taking care of’ (*piara*) – like an adoptive child - the land or the sea (Visser, 1989; Chou, 1997). The social relationships to land and sea are regarded here as being circular in character; ownership should circulate. It is evident that the more highly valued quality is the *social* mobility of the resource, not only in the case of marine resources and the coastal



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waters, but also in some cases including the land and crops, differentiating annuals from perennial crops (Aragon, 2000: 55; Dove, 2000).

The cases mentioned are used to show that the concept of territory as a physical or geographical place is too narrow as it does not allow for the acknowledgement of *the social organisation of place-making*. I therefore propose that we replace territory by the concept of territoriality. This wider concept should capture people's access to a particular geographical space in order to appropriate resources, but it should also allow for the inclusion of their histories, cultural values, and the social organisation of place making, that is of processes and ideas about access, distribution, and tenure. There is a tendency to approach territorial relationships as linear or synchronic. However, present-day institutional arrangements clearly have a history (Douglas, 1987) whether this relationship is expressed in an ancestral idiom (Osseweijer, 2001) or a local-colonial-global idiom (Acciaioli, 2002; Teitler, 2003). Moreover, despite globalizing tendencies to abstraction, individuals and groups continue to shape their practices according to the multiple realities they are simultaneously engaged in.

Part of the difficulty faced in the organisation of more democratic forms of coastal management lies in the fact that several cognitive dichotomies still play a dominant role. The land-sea contiguity mentioned earlier implies that the more important opposition is not the opposition between the land and the sea, but between the land (*cum* open sea) and the coast. The following binary oppositions are often associated with this dichotomy: modernity vs. tradition, sedentarisation vs mobility and fluidity, property based resource tenure vs absence of a tenurial 'system', large-scale trawling vs small-scale fisheries, vertical/professional networks vs horizontal/kinship bound networks, and nationalisation/globalization vs localization.. Thus, the contention that coastal people are 'un-civil' and do not acknowledge tenurial systems should be seen in the context of a wider set of binary oppositions originating from a hierarchy of discourses which is dominated by centralizing and elitist powers. Of course, it is our task and responsibility to cast a critical eye on such easy dichotomies as they have consequences for the practice of rural, including coastal development.

Decentralisation, governance, and territoriality

Territoriality includes images and dreams, as well as practices relating to particular territorial spaces. This is relevant for geo-political and administrative policy making and planning concerning fisheries, which per definition are assumed to *take place* in particular zones or



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bounded spaces. As opposed to the legally fixed borders of the political-administrative territory of a provincial or district government, territoriality – covering also the social relationship between people regarding the coastal and marine waters - may very well include more than one, *discontinuous*, geographical places that stretch beyond the governing powers of the province or district. The Bugis and Bajau fishers of Sulawesi and Kalimantan regard parts of the Flores Sea, Arafura Sea, and even parts of the Australian territorial waters as belonging to their fisheries territory (cf. Stacey, 1999). Other examples of disjunct territorialities are the origin places recognised by Aboriginal Australians, so lyrically described in Bruce Chatwin's *The Songlines* (1988), or the classical anthropological example of the Trobriand *kula*-ring (Malinowski, 1922).

Conversely, different territorialities can also be acknowledged within one territorial space. In the case of the Eastern Indonesian Kei Islands described above (Adhuri, 2004), the Christian and Moslem villagers share the same territory which is sanctioned by their common ancestors. But conflict arises between the two groups as a result of different social, ethnic, and religious identities and economic interests. Elsewhere, the trawlers and artisanal fishers of the Coromandel coast of India (Bavinck, 2001) share the same environmental space and ecological niche. Here too, conflicts arise as a result of material, technological, and social-cultural differences, generated within and between the different political-economic networks of the actors involved.

With globalisation, the multi-locality of people's ways of making a living accelerates diversification, exchange of knowledge and information, and livelihoods become increasingly dependent on translocal networks (Mazzucato et al., 2004). Consequently, people may deploy different activities in one locality, but they may also spread their activities over different locations, taking local knowledge and perceptions with them. Thus, the perception and valuation of the maritime environment and of fisheries practices and techniques become themselves de-localised and contrasted with other values and ideas concerning coastal maritime resources, tenurial regimes, and their organisation. In this interface of different kinds and origins of knowledge and practice, coastal actors become aware of the particular knowledge and power constellations at work, and react upon them. The analytical study of what actually happens in such situations under particular social, political, etc. conditions needs more dynamic and actor-oriented conceptualisation of governance than systems and rules. The concepts of governability and discipline are worth trying.



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