like the native population. The five factors are the wisdom obtained by the Enggano community from life experiences in a long historical trajectory.

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**CHANGING TIMES AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN SUMBA, NTT**

*Istutiah Gunawan*

*Independent scholar*

In this paper, two cases of collective violence in Nusa Tenggara Timur, occurring 15 years apart in 1998 and in 2013, will be compared. Both were cases of horizontal conflict in the Kabupaten (District) Sumba Barat dan Sumba Barat Daya, where regional loyalties were mobilized by candidates for Bupati (Head of the District) and Wakil Bupati (Deputy Head) in the Pilkada elections. In both cases, the candidates were of the same religion (Protestantism in the case of Sumba Barat and Catholicism in the case of Sumba Barat Daya), but from different ethnic groups. In the case of Sumba Barat, the cause of the violence was perceived corruption in the office of the Bupati and the Bupati’s insensitivity to the demands for clean government; in Sumba Barat Daya it was corruption in the KPU (General Elections Commission). In Sumba Barat the violence was resolved by the Governor of NTT initiating a peace ceremony and compensation to families who lost members (numbers range from 26 to about 62 people died); in Sumba Barat Daya the conflict ended with the incumbent Bupati stepping down to avoid further bloodshed (3 people died). The incumbent Bupati and his opponent then held a reconciliation meeting.

**Keywords:** Kamis Berdarah, Bupati Rudolf Malo, Kisruh di Sumba Barat Daya, Pilkada di SBD, Kornelis Kodi Mete

**BACKGROUND**

In the past, there had been many cases of wars between different (sub-)ethnic groups, usually about land. However, with the advent of almost universal education, intermarriages, world
religions, modern communications and market forces, there are forces that tend to unify the different ethnic groups.

Kabupaten Sumba Barat is predominantly Protestant while Sumba Barat Daya is predominantly Catholic. There is a small percentage of Muslims in both Kabupatenes, mostly immigrants from Bima. Many also adhere to the indigenous faith called Marapu (ancestors).

**Sumba Barat 1998-1999**

In 1998-1999 the conflict in Kabupaten Sumba Barat started with demonstrations in late October 1998 in the capital, Waikabubak, by young graduates, mostly from the Loli ethnic group, who were disaffected by what they perceived as corruption in the selection of candidates for the civil service. Those who were accepted were mostly from the Wewewa (or Waijewa) ethnic group, and close to the family of the Bupati, Rudolf Mete Malo, a Wewewan. One Wewewan who passed the examination did not even sit in the test; she asked another person to sit for her (a practice known as ‘praktek joki’). In the euphoria after Reformasi in Jakarta in May 1998, the young graduates found this corruption unacceptable. When the demonstrations were not responded to by the Bupati (who said that the matter was not in his power to do anything about), the demonstrations became more heated.

The Bupati was a product of Suharto’s New Order. Though born in Sumba, he grew up in Java, married a Sundanese and joined the Air Force. He was reported to be rather embarrassed by the “backwardness” of Sumba and keen to bring it to modernity. His appointment to the position of Bupati was part of the New Order’s ‘rule’ that 4 of the 12 positions of Bupati in NTT must be occupied by appointed men from the armed forces. The appointment of Colonel Rudolf Malo in 1995 as Bupati sidelined the man voted by the local DPRD-II (local Parliament), a senior official from the Golkar Party, Timotheus Langgar.

As the demonstrations against Malo continued, the graduates demanded that the Bupati came out, calling out his name “Giani Mete! Giani Mete!” (‘Where is Mete!’). This was considered very insulting, as they were using his ‘nama keras’, ngara katto, which is only allowed to be used by his parents when they are angry. The following day 12 trucks with some 500 Waijewans arrived in Waikabubak, which is in Loli, to “defend the Bupati’s name”, but police intercepted them, and their machetes, spears and rocks were confiscated. In the increasing tension, several shop-owners from the Wewewa ethnic group were chased out of their shops in Waikabubak (there was also a rumor (untrue) that a Loli man was killed in the market in Wewewe). Although the leader of the demonstrators was a young graduate from Wanukaka, Bupati Malo suspected that behind it all was the hand of the Chairman of the DPRD-II, Toda Lero Ora, S.H., a Loli man from the Golkar Party. The conflict was seen to be a conflict between the Bupati and the Chairman of DPRD-II.

On Thursday 5 November 1998 several thousand Wewewans marched into Waikabubak. Most of the marchers thought that they were going to protect their relatives in Waikabubak, but on the way some of them burned 90 Loli houses to the ground. Then they marched on to target Tarung, the sacred mother village of Loli.

The Loli men successfully defended Tarung; in this they believed that supernatural forces were on their side, as the attack was mounted in the sacred month of Poddu, when people are not allowed to make a lot of noise, beat gongs or wage war. The Wewewa troops were defeated and several dozen Wewewans were killed on that one day, hence the term ‘Kamis Berdarah’ (Bloody Thursday).
This conflict was horrifying to both Wewewans and Lolinese. Although there have been many conflicts about land in the past, in 1975 a peace agreement had been held in Wone where both sub-ethnic groups made a peace ceremony where they made an oath before God and their ancestors to cease warring. “If I break this vow, may I be struck by lightning as I cross the hills; If I betray my word, may I be struck by a snake as I cross the fields.” That the many casualties were from the invaders, and none reportedly from the Loli side, was ascribed by many Lolinese (as well as by Wewewans), to the breaking of this oath by the Wewewans.

Yet more casualties would likely result if some traditional leaders from both Loli and Wewewa were not taking affairs into their own hands. An ex-Kepala Desa of Waikarou in Loli and the Kepala Desa of Mareda Kalada in Wewewa, upon hearing of the conflict, went to check the safety of students in the Agricultural High School in Kuriteppe, in Loli but near the border, to make sure that the Wewewa students staying in the hostel were safe. They quickly agreed that they would abide by the peace agreement of 1975 and would resist demands that their villages be dragged into the conflict.

Much criticism was pointed to the Government apparatus. The police and military did not act when the Loli villages were burned down by the Wewewans at the border between Wewewa and Loli. They were only stopped by the Loli men before they could climb the hill to reach Kampung Tarung, and many casualties happened only 200 meters from the Police Headquarters. The bodies lay there in the open for a day and a half; the shops were locked, their owners fled. The Government was paralysed and Bupati Malo was hiding in the police barracks.

This paralysis lasted until the Governor of NTT, Piet Tallo, flew in from Jakarta, and the Mobile Brigade flown in from Kupang. After peace was restored, a peace ceremony was held in January 1999 in the central stadium, attended by the Bupati, the Chairman of DPRD-II, and representatives of all religions and villages. Families whose members were killed (all Wewewans) were given compensation by the Government. Many Loli families felt bitter that no compensation was given to the families whose houses were burned down by the Wewewa mob. Many Sumbanese of the Marapu faith thought that the ceremony did not go according to Marapu and Sumbanese adat, but their concern was not taken seriously.

Sumba Barat Daya, 2013-2014

In 2013-14 in the Kabupaten Sumba Barat Daya violence erupted after the Pilkada election in 5 August 2013. Sumba Barat Daya (or SBD) was previously part of Sumba Barat; it became a Kabupaten in 2007. The popular incumbent Bupati, Dr. Kornelis Kodi Mete, was previously a Deputy Bupati of Kabupaten Sumba Barat. He is a medical doctor, a Catholic from the sub-ethnic group of Kodi. His main challenger, Markus Dairu Tallu (MDT) was an ex-army man, also a Catholic but from the Wewewa sub-ethnic group.

The incumbent Bupati was unexpectedly defeated by Markus Dairu Tallu. The Bupati and his candidate Deputy Daud Lende Umbu Moto challenged the result in the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) in Jakarta. They requested a repeat count of the votes, and the Police and Bawaslu (General Elections Supervisory Body) found that there was a discrepancy of more than 13,000 additional fraudulent votes which benefited MDT. The case was brought to the local court in Sumba, which found the original vote count was fraudulent and jailed the Chairman of the Electoral Commission (KPU) for 13 months.
However, the Constitutional Court under Chairman Akil Mochtar in Jakarta overturned the finding of the recount, disregarding the 144 boxes of evidence, and awarded the victory to the candidate with the smaller number of votes, Markus Dairu Tallu. Followers of the incumbent Bupati waylaid the followers of MDT on the way home, victorious, from Jakarta. 3 people died, 19 houses were burned down and hundreds of people left their homes to look for protection in the police headquarters in the capital, Tambolaka.

Although the local DPRD-II refused to accept the Constitutional Court’s decision, the DPRD-I in Kupang was of the view that the Court’s decision was final, and instructed the local parliament in Sumba Barat Daya to install Markus Dairu Tallu and Ndara Tanggu Kaha as Bupati and Deputy Bupati on 6 August 2014 for the 2014-2019 period.

Kornelis Kodi Mete accepted the Mahkamah Konstitusi’s decree, saying he’d rather step down than seeing more bloodshed. On 2 September 2013 he and MDT made a reconciliation, witnessed by the Chief of Police of Sumba Barat, Chief of the Military District of Sumba Barat and the Catholic Bishop of Waitabula.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Sumba Barat in 1998 may never have happened if the demands of the young graduates were not brushed aside by the Bupati, who saw these protests and the subsequent developments as “rekayasa” (‘engineered’) by his perceived opponent, the Chairman of DPRD-II. Some thought that he used New Order tactics of intimidation using his Wewewan relatives, but once he incited them he lost control of the process. The inaction of the Police and military in the conflict was puzzling; possibly because the Bupati, a Colonel, was of a higher rank than either the head of the Police or the Military.

The reaction of the Governor was swift in cooling down the temperature, and the peace ceremony provided a formal end to the conflict, though it was still not satisfactory for adherents of the Marapu faith. Many reports about the conflict did not mention the roles of traditional leaders in preventing the conflict from claiming more lives.

The conflict in Sumba Barat Daya probably also may never have happened if members of the KPU did their job properly, and the Constitutional Court was seen to be just and non-corruptible. The refusal of the local DPRD to accept its decision but that there was no mechanism to lodge an appeal caused many months of uncertainty. Many people were of the opinion that the conflict happened longer than necessary because MDT had lived in Jakarta as an Army man and knew his way around the judges in the Constitutional Court. That Kornelis Kodi Mete chose to step down to prevent further bloodshed was seen as an honourable act, which may have helped him win the Pilkada election 5 years later in 2018.

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EXIT FROM VIOLENCE: RECONCILIATION AND PEACE MAKING IN INDONESIA

Y. Tri Subagya
Universitas Sanata Dharma

Violent conflicts become reoccurrence phenomenon in the post colonial history of Indonesia. However, the pattern of the conflicts are different in different periods and different regime of power and so do the approaches to take measure coping with it. Both state and non-state agencies initiated peace making activities to bring the conflicted groups into peace process. The most common model to reduce the violence so far use the security approach in which the government made chase fire and sponsored peace accord between the conflicted parties. As to follow up the program, they deployed military and state apparatuses to facilitate soio economic recovery for the communities affected by the conflict. To some extent, ethnic and religious leaders, social workers, academician and NGO activists also developed peace and initiated reconciliation in different level of societies. Since there were sometimes no coordination among the peace initiators, their works seem overlap one to another. This paper describes the violent conflicts and efforts to develop peace and reconciliation in Indonesia in order to seach for anthropological perspective on conflict resolution. This paper is divided in three sections before it comes up to conclusion. First is to review the violent conflicts in the post colonial history of Indonesia with the special attention to ethno-religious violence and its peace process. Secondly I examine peace making activities in some area of Indonesia. I will highlight the peace efforts initiated by both state and non state actors. Then I will take into account the common problems arising from the previous approach of peace making and search for appropriate model to prevent the humanitarian tragedy reoccurring in the future.

Keywords: violent conflicts, peace making, reconciliation, anthropology of peace

Rethinking the Politics of Difference in Indonesia: Ethnicity, Religion, Class Relations

Coordinators: Budi Hernawan (Driyarkara School of Philosophy) & Thung Ju Lan (Indonesian Institute of Sciences/LIPI)

Whilst Indonesia was founded on the principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the politics of difference has not prevailed as the governing principle in law, society and polity. Instead domination of the powerful has claimed of assuming the right to govern. During the Suharto’s New Order, the military dictatorship dominated Indonesia for more than three decades with complete impunity whereas in the post-reformasi era, majority-minority paradigm seems to rule the country. In both contexts, the rule of law has never been the top priority. Rather, the state of exception, as Carl Schmitt coins, governs and even condones the majority-minority paradigm. As result the Indonesia’s diversity in ethnicity, religion and class has been subjected to the domination of the majority and its narrative. The element of class and its vested interests, however, has been overlooked in the discussion of politics of difference in Indonesia. Inspired by Christian Fuchs who delves into the nexus between class and social movement, this panel will rethink the power...